Insurance and Portfolio Decisions A Wealth Effect Puzzle



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- We study household's decisions to:
 - 1. Invest in risky assets
 - 2. Insure against risk
- The two decisions reflect opposite risk retention tradeoff:
 - An agent increases his risk exposure by investing
 - An agent reduces his risk exposure by purchasing insurance
- Thus, factors that promote risk taking should
 - Increase the demand for risky assets
 - Lower the demand for insurance



Introduction

- So far, the literature has studied the two decisions separately.
- Object of the paper:
 - Explore possible joint determinants and frictions
 - In particular: Test whether wealth has opposite effect on portfolio and insurance coverage decisions
- We do so using detailed micro level data from survey in U.S.

- We find that
 - Joint determinants (subjective expectations, risk attitude)
 Common frictions (liquidity constraints, literacy, information)
 - 3. Insurance and risky investments **both increase** with wealth
- We try to explain this *Insurance-Portfolio Puzzle* theoretically
 - With conventional theory
 - By considering various behavioral factors
- We cannot explain the puzzle fully

Empirical approach

- Strategy:
 - 1. Estimate a baseline, easily interpretable, model
 - 2. Conduct battery of robustness tests
- Baseline model:

$$I_i = \alpha_0 W_i + \alpha_1 X_i + \alpha_2 Y_i + \varepsilon_i^{T}$$

$$R_i = \beta_0 W_i + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i^{R}$$

 I_i and R_i = insurance and risky investments, left censored at zero ($\varepsilon_{i,j}^I \varepsilon_i^R$) follow bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ

- **Exercise**: Test $H_0 = \{ \alpha_0 * \beta_0 < 0, > 0 \}, H'_0 = \{ \alpha_1 * \beta_1 < 0 \}$
- Baseline model is estimated with data collected in the Survey of Consumer Expectations and focuses on car insurance decisions

Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)

- Produced by Federal Reserve Bank of New York since June 2013
- Key features:
 - Monthly
 - Internet-based
 - ~1,300 respondents
 - Nationally representative of U.S. household heads
- In total four waves
 - Aug-Sept 2015
 - Aug-Sept 2016
 - Feb 2021
 - April 2021

Thank you SCOR !!!



Index of insurance coverage (I_i)

- We focus on auto and homeowner insurance
- We ask about 7 components of auto insurance contract:
 - 1. Liability (covers damages caused by insured to others)
 - 2. Personal injury (pays for insured medical bills regardless of who is at fault)
 - 3. Under/Uninsured (pays when other party has not enough insurance)
 - 4. Collision (covers insured vehicle after accident regardless of who is at fault)
 - 5. Comprehensive (covers insured vehicle from damage not due to collision)
 - 6. Rental (pays for a rental car while the insured vehicle is being repaired)
 - 7. Towing/road side assistance

Insurance and risky investments variables (Y_i, Z_i)

- Insurance Variables (Y_i) :
 - Value of vehicle
 - Premium paid
 - Population density within zip code
 - Measure of objective risk (damages incurred past 2 years)
 - Measure of subjective risk (expected damages next 2 years)
 - Knowledge of car insurance
- Risky investments variables (Z_i) :
 - Expectations (change in U.S. stock market next 12 months)
 - Knowledge of debts and savings

Individual Characteristics (X_i)

- Age of household head
- Education attainment
- Wealth
- Measure of financial literacy
- Measure of credit worthiness (credit score)
- Measure of **liquidity constraint** or financial fragility
- Subjective measure of risk attitude
- Other: race, marital status, employment status, number of kids...

Insurance Coverage							Risky Investments					
Wealth	6.5e-04*** (7.0e-05)	5.5e-04*** (6.6e-05)	3.7e-04*** (6.7e-05)	3.0e-04*** (6.2e-05)	3.3e-04*** (6.4e-05)		Wealth	2.6e-04*** (2.2e-05)	2.6e-04*** (2.2e-05)	2.5e-04*** (2.3e-05)	1.9e-04*** (2.0e-05)	1.8e-04*** (1.9e-05)
Car Value		2.4e-02*** (4.5e-03)	2.3e-02*** (4.4e-03)	1.6e-02*** (3.9e-03)	1.7e-02*** (3.9e-03)							
Objective Risk		1.2e-01** (5.6e-02)	1.1e-01** (5.5e-02)	5.6e-02 (5.8e-02)	5.8e-02 (5.8e-02)							
Premium		5.7e-05 (1.1e-04)	1.1e-04 (1.2e-04)	1.8e-04 (1.2e-04)	1.8e-04 (1.2e-04)							
Age			1.8e-02*** (2.7e-03)	1.2e-02*** (2.6e-03)	1.1e-02*** (2.6e-03)		Age			-1.3e-03** (6.6e-04)	-2.3e-03*** (6.4e-04)	-1.6e-03** (6.6e-04)
Zip Density			4.9e-03 (9.0e-03)	2.8e-03 (8.7e-03)	3.5e-03 (8.7e-03)		Zip Density			-9.7e-04 (1.2e-03)	-1.2e-04 (1.1e-03)	-4.8e-04 (1.2e-03)
Education			2.0e-01*** (6.2e-02)	6.6e-02 (6.2e-02)	8.1e-02 (6.2e-02)		Education			9.4e-02*** (1.6e-02)	4.4e-02*** (1.6e-02)	3.5e-02** (1.6e-02)
Subjective Risk				1.2e-01** (4.8e-02)	1.7e-01*** (4.6e-02)		Expected Stock Change				3.7e-01*** (1.2e-01)	3.0e-01** (1.2e-01)
Low Numeracy				-2.3e-01** (9.6e-02)	-2.5e-01*** (9.6e-02)		Low Numeracy				-7.4e-02*** (2.4e-02)	-6.2e-02** (2.4e-02)
Know Car Insurance				2.4e-01*** (2.7e-02)	2.4e-01*** (2.7e-02)		Know Savings and Debts				3.0e-02** (1.2e-02)	1.7e-02 (1.2e-02)
Credit Worthiness				3.0e-02 (3.3e-02)	2.7e-02 (3.3e-02)		Credit Worthiness				2.1e-02** (8.1e-03)	2.0e-02** (8.1e-03)
Financial Liquidity				6.7e-01*** (1.4e-01)	7.0e-01*** (1.4e-01)		Financial Liquidity				3.2e-01*** (3.6e-02)	3.0e-01*** (3.6e-02)
Risk Attitude					-5.7e-02** (2.5e -02)		Risk Attitude					4.4e-02*** (6.1e-03)
AtanhRho	1.0e-01*** (2.8e-02)	8.7e-02*** (2.8e-02)	8.6e-02*** (2.8e-02)	6.8e-02** (2.8e-02)	6.9e-02** (2.8e-02)		N	1811	1811	1811	1806	1806
							AIC	8.8e+03	8.7e+03	8.6e+03	8.4e+03	8.3e+03

Result 1: Joint Determinants and Frictions

Joint Determinants :

- Subjective expectations
- Risk attitude
- Age

Joint Frictions :

- Liquidity constraints
- Numeracy
- Information/knowledge
- Education



Result 2: Wealth Effect

- Insurance coverage and risky assets holding are both positively correlated with wealth
- This is a puzzle, i.e. inconsistent with standard theory
- Puzzle driven in part by a surprising behavioral asymmetry:
 - The poor are more likely to under-invest,
 - The rich are more likely to over-insure.
- We estimate the aggregate cost of over-insuring by the wealthy to exceed \$14 billion per year in the U.S.

- 1. Alternative definitions of key variables (wealth, insurance,..)
- 2. Restricted samples (e.g. states with similar legal minima,...)
- 3. Interaction effects (e.g. Car Value * Wealth)
- 4. Possible wealth endogeneity
- 5. Other forms of insurance (homeowner, extended warranty)
- 6. Different country (France) + Industry data (Bancassurance)

- Robustness tests confirm :
 - Common determinants and frictions
 - Insurance and risky investments both increase with wealth

Question: Can we reconcile this puzzle with theory?

Standard Theories

- Simultaneous decisions
- Background risks
- Wealth-dependent losses ; probabilities ; risk aversion
- Liability insurance
- Liquidity constraints
- Adverse selection/moral hazard
- Supply side effects

Behavioral Theories

- Prospect theory
- Risk (mis)perception
- Rational inattention
- Information frictions
- Participation costs
- Context-dependent preferences
- Non-monetary benefits
- Regret avoidance

New theories we are investigating

- Preference for positively skewed lotteries
- Consumption commitments
- Loss aversion
- Mental accounting
- Salience theory
- Disappointment aversion

Conclusion

- We find robust evidence of
 - 1. Joint determinants and frictions
 - 2. Insurance-portfolio puzzle: demand increases with wealth
- The puzzle is statiscally robust and economically relevant
- Puzzle is driven in part by a specific behavioral pattern: the poor invest too conservatively; the rich over-insure.
- So far, we have failed to explain the puzzle with either standard or behavioral theories

We welcome suggestions !!!!